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Summer List 7, Sheet 2 
No. 75-1782 
AFW FABRIC CORP. ~oCA2 
(Hays, Smith, con; Meskill) 
v. 
../ 
MARSHALL Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: This is the case related to No. 75-1660 and 75-1753 
on this list. Please read that memo first. The issues and arguments are the 
same. The difference is that in this case the DC denied a motion for a preliminary 
injunction to enjoin a merger to be effected under N.Y. 1 s long form merger statute. 
CA 2 rev'd holding that the injunction should issue. CA 2 summarized its holding 
------...-'"\, --- ~---
as follows: 
"We hold that when controlling stockholders and 
directors of a publicly-held corporation cause it 
( 
- 2 -
to expend corporate funds to force elimination 
of minority stockholders' equity participation 
for reasons not benefiting the corporation but 
rather serving only the interests of the 
l 
controlling stockholders such conduct will be 
enjoined pursuant to Section lO(b) and 
Rule lOb-5 which prohibits 11 any act, practice, 
or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud':":" :' in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security. 11 
CA 2 also said, 
\ 
11 In the present case tl;_e 1mer--&er 1 itself constitutes 
aJ raudu!..;nt scheme because it represents an 
attemp1 by the majority stockholders to utilize 
corporate funds for strictly personal benefit. ? r -Under these circumstances it would surely be 
anomalous to hold that a cause of action is 
stated under § lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 when the 
fraudulent conduct in connection with a purchase 
or sale of securities includes deception but that 
similarly fraudulent practices carried out with 
prior disclosure to the helpless victim do not 
give rise to a Rule lOb-5 claim. 11 
In this case the corporations involved were Concord, which had been 
closely held and went public in 1968 when its stock was high, and AFW which had 
been formed to effect a merger with Concord and b d back the publicly held 
stock when the price was low. Concord transferred its 68% of the stock in 
Concord to AFW. AFW made a tender offer of the remaining stock publicly 
held, explaining exactly what it intended to do. Under NY law, 68% of the voting 
stock is enough to approve a merger, but, unlike the Del. short form merger, 
prior notice is necessary. 
2. DISCUSSION: Since this case presents a long form, instead of a -
short form merger, it would complement No. 75-1753. 
There is a response. 
Kovacic CA and DC ops in petn 
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Justice Powell-- (~J:tit.~t%:\ ~~~~;;:~ 
This is a brief memo on~, No. 75-lr!2 ~~o~ ~~~ 
case), which has been relisted for the 10/8 co /~~ 
The Court has already granted cert in No. 75-1753, Santa Fe,~ 
which raises the same 10-b-5 question as the instant case only in ~ 
~the context of a short form merger. There are presently three vo~ 
•' ~·'to grant in~: . yourself, Justice Rehnquisrt, and Justice ~ 
~·Blackmun. You asked for a brief memo on whether to vote to hold ~ 
the case for Santa Fe. 
FIRST: - My first problem with the case is that I think -
Justice Stevens is correct in his conclusion that the case is 
moot. This case was an appeal to CA2 from the DC's denial of ~~~ 
a preliminary injunction to enjoin a long form merger. CA2 ·~ - . 4f4._,.., 
reversed, holding that the injunction should issue. So the case ~-
decision of CA2 to grant a preliminary~ would be he~ert from a 
injunction. 1\ One month after the announcement of the decision 
of CA2 in the instant case, a ermanent injunction was entered 
against the challenged merger in state court. Respondent thus 
.... --------- -~- : -' ~ ~ . ~ 
contends that the case is now moot. PetrJl sugges~that the respondent~ 's 
claim for damages remains "viable" and constitutes a sufficient 
basis upon which to reject the suggestion of mootness. But as 
respondente points out, petrs will be liable in any event for the 
unnecessary expenses to which they have pwt respondent• wide~ 
t~~ subjected Concord; the monies they expended in furtherance of 
a transaction which they have conceded to be without business 
c 
purpose are r~verable by Concord whether or not petr's conduct 
violated the federal securities laws. Any other damages which petrs 
have in mind would surely have to await the outcome of a trial and 
~ 
are thuse~oo speculative to present a live controversy. 
My own view of the mootness issue is that Justice Stevens is 
right. 
0~ 
2~•~·~~~~~~i~e~a~,~e~i--•i8&~i~w~i•Q~ a preliminary injunctio~, a question mooted 
----by the entry of a permanent injunction in state court. 
SECOND: If you disagree on the mootness point, I still think 
this case is a grant rather than a11* hold. The only difference -
between the long form merger case and the short form merger case 
is that (as I'm sure you already know!) the long form merger 
..... -statutes require prior notice _.. to dissenting shareholders and ---an opportunity to seek premerger injunctive relief. CA2 regarded 
the unavailability of this additional remedy in the short form 
merger case (Santa t e) as "further justification for the intervention 
of federal courts to remedy any fraudulent conduct." Thus, at 
~ast from CA2 1 s point of view, if the Court a SS ' reverses 
in Santa Fe, it should be clear that there is no< • 10-b-5 
violation in the long form merger situation, since there are the 
added protections of notice and opportunity for premerger injunctive 
relief. But if the Court concludes that there is something 
to CA2's position in the short form merger situation, the question 
remains whether the long form merger situation is different. To 
some, that difference may be significant. For example, in his 
concurring opinion in the Sante Fe ~ short form case, Judge 
Mansfield noted that full a~ce disclosure of all relevant facts 
and the opportunity for premerger injunctive relief may be effective 
protection. 
In sum, it seems to me that the Court can't lose by taking 
both cases, and it can be argued that it might be helpful to 
~ decide in one action whether the long form/short form diffe~~A~ 
are important on this issue. 
Court ................... . Voted on .... ... ........... , 19 .. . 
Argued ......... .......... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . No. 75-1782 
Submitted .............. .. , 19 . . . Announced . ... ............ , 19 .. . 
AFW FABRIC CORP. 
vs. 
MARSHEL 
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EC/// 1/18/77 
TO: MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
FROM: Gene Corney 
RE: No. 75-1753--Santa Fe Industries v. Green 
BOBTAIL BENCH MEMO 
The issue in this case is narrow but important: are 
"short-form" mergers designed to "freeze-out" minority shareholders 
violative of section 10 and Rule lOb-5 even where there is full 
disclosure of all material facts. [Both lower courts resolved 
the issue on the assumption that there were neither misrepre-
sentations nor nondisclosures in the relevant information statement. 
------~~---~ ... ---
Although resp now suggests in its brief that there were misrep-
resentations and nondisclosures, this Court should treat this 
as a "full and complete" disclosure case.] CA2 answered the 
question in the affirmative, suggesting that the "fraud" was 
"inherent in the merger itself." 
On a fair reading of CA2's opinion, the essential element 
for a lOb-5 violation in these circumstances is the absence of 
two other facts: (1) the undervaluation--! should say "alleged 
undervaluation"--of the Kirby stock; and (2) the lack of notice 
or disclosure prior to the merger. But neither of these latter 
two factors appears to have been determinative. In the first 
place, CA2 reaffirmed~opkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (CA2 1972), 
which impliedly held that undervaluation standing alone does not 
;1. 
violate lOb-5. Moreover, I can't see the relevance of the lack 
of prior disclosure, since CA2 had held only thirteen days before 
Green that a "long-form" merger designed to "freeze-out" minority 
interests of lOb-5. [We granted cert in the 
long-form the judgment, and remanded for con-
sideration of mootness]. Finally, we have the statement from 
Green itself: "If there is no valid corporate purpose for the 
merger, then even the most brazen disclosure of that fact to 
the minority shareholders in no way mitigates the fraudulent 
conduct." 
~ be the key 
Thus, the lack of a valid corporate purpose seems to 
----------~-~ ~ 
element for the lOb-5 violation. 
The background for this holding needs to be highlighted. 
As you know, some 38 states have enacted "short-form merger" 
statutes, thus evidencing a legislative judgment that a minority 
shareholder!·s rightY to continued ownership of the company must 
,, , 
be limited in order to facilitate mergers, and that appraisal' 
s~ be ~e exclusive rem~dy for corportate mismanagement in 
this regard. To be sure, if the "information statement" supplied 
to the minority shareholders contains false, inaccurate, or 
deceptive information, a federal cause of action under Rule lOb-5 
muld be es tablished~ But the issue here is whether in the 
absence of such misrepresentations or nondisclosures such a 
cause of action is established. In that regard, it is worth 
noting that the decision of CA2 rests upon notion of the 
.... "*""""-",__.~ ... ... ,.., ,........_., ~ twz: ., 
"fiduciary duty" owed by majority stockholders to minority 
.... .......... ~-- --~ 




a matter of state law, and in the case of Delaware it is clear 
that the state has taken the position that "fiduniary dut! es" 
'- ~------------------------------do not preclude short-form mergers. 
The issue then is whether the federal statute precludes 
such mergers where there is no valid corporate purpose. Resolution 
of the issue must start, as you noted in Ernst and Ernst, with 
the language of the statute. The basic problem is one of 
determining congressional intent. The mere fact that state law 
does a~prove short form mergers is not controlling, since a 
congressional decision to subject short-form mergers to federal 
regulation would clearly pre-empt state legislation in the area. 
There is nothing to the argument that £0ngress could not as a 
constitutional matter declare illegal short form mergers that 
are accomplished without a valid corporate purpose. Whether 
Congress in fact did so is an entirely different question. 
As to the language of the statute and the language of the 
Rule, I think the petitioners do a fairly good job of showing 
that "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" 
------------------~'--does not include a "full disclosure" short-form merger. Such 
a merger certainly is not "manipulative," as that term was 
.... __,...........- ~ f 
defined in Ernst: "conduct that was designed to deceive or 
defraud investors by controlling or artifically affecting the 
!)rice of securities." And here there certainly was no 
decpetion. Unfortunately, as you noted in Ernst, there is not 
a great deal of legislative history on section lOb, and thus 
the legislative materials are not of considerable help in 
defr"'"~ 
S8 •'1:ii~ the scope of the "federal fraud." 
But the case law on lOb and lOb-S is helpful. Though I 
have obviously not read all the cases, a recent note in the 
Harvard Law Review suggests--and I don't doubt its accuracy--
# :,.C.. \ that no appellate decision before Marshel (the long f~m case 
from CA2) and Green (the instant, short-form case) had permitted 
e. 
a lOb-S claim without some ele t of misre resentation or non-
dmsclosure. Judge Moore's dissent examines some of the 
·"""" dh 1 ld h more prom1n~ent cases, an e 6 a so cone u es t at even a 
cursory review of the decisions indicates that a lOb-S claim 
will n~~ in- th,.;._ absence of _g_ecep t;!on or misrepresentation. 
See App. at 1S8a-163a. See also Superintendent of Ins. v. 
Banker's Life, 404 U.S. 6, tl IJ 12: "Congress by §lOb did 
not seek to regulate transactions which constitute no more than 
internal corporate mismanagement." 
Given the absence of any clear indication that Congress 
intended to intrude into an ..-. area primarily governmed by 
state law, and the subsequent cases of this Court and the lower 
courts interpreting the scope of the "federal fraud" 
cause of action under section lOb, I would hesitate before 
affirming the decision of CA2. In-deed, the results of CA2's -
~ . d~c1 ·on strongly suggest that the decision 
~the first place, the decision apparently 
~ devel oment of a ~fe'Ji'eral ;...ommon law of 
should be reversed. 
authorizes the 
fiduciary duty, .. 
and t s would relegate state regulation of corporate mismanagement 
..._-/ 
in~ which the mismanagement is accomplished apart 
s. 
from any securities ... transaction. Second, both Blue Chig 
and Ernst and Ernst emphasized the .. difficulty of conducting 
business under the constant threat of indeterminate liability. 
See 421 u.s. at 747-748, and 96 S. Ct. at 1391. After this 
/ 
decision you can no longer even rely on compliance with smte 
~· -
statutory procedures. Third, the test suggested by CA2------ -
valid corporate purpose--seems especially hard to apply in this 
context. On the 
minority may be 
purposes. But, on the other hand, to the extent that it is 
necessary to eliminate the majority to accomplish those benefits, 
there is an .._ "invalid" corporate purpose. 
In the final analysis, it appears that the gravamen of 
this complaint is that the merger was "unfair." That may well 
be, but resolution of issues like that is for the states, 
at least that is how I understood the federal regulatory scheme 
up until this decision. In effect, the plaintiffs below would 
have us read section lOb to prohibit "any manipulative or 
deceptive or unfair device" If that is what Congress meant, 
which I doubt, it should have said so. 
f)V' 
A manipulative~deceptive device may produce unfair results, 
but not every procedure which produces allegedly unfair results 
is manipulative and deceptive. 
LFP/1ab 12/27/76 
. . 
December 27, 1976 
No. 75-1753 Santa Fe Industries, Inc., et al. v. 
S. William Green, et al. 
This is the case in which CA 2 (Medina for the 
court; Mansfield, concurring; and Moore dissenting) held, 
in effect, that Rule 10b(5) preempts state corporate law with 
respect to short form mergers. Moreover, CA 2 held, in effect, 
that the "freeze-out" of minority stockholders under the 
Delaware short form merger law, requiring no prior notice and 
no corporate purpose for the benefit of all shareholders, 
constitutes a fraud (i.e. a manipulative or deceptive device) 
under 10b(5). The holding of CA 2 is so sweeping that, if 
affirmed ftwould create a substantial body of federal corporate 
~ 
law displacing traditional state corporate law. Thirty-eight 
of the fifty states have short form merger laws (which vary in 
certain respects), but CA 2's opinion- at least its rationale-
is not limited to short form mergers. 
In a rather unusual per curiam, CA 2 declined to 
review the case en bane because they deemed it of "such extra-
ordinary importance that we are confident the Supreme Court" ,, 
will grant certiorari. 
2 0 
.. 
Statement of the Case 
A number of subsidiaries of the Santa Fe Railway 
Company are involved. But for purposes of understanding the 
case, and indeed for deciding it, we may assume the following: 
A subsidiary of Santa Fe [a predecessor of Santa Fe Resources, 
Inc o (Resources)], acquired 60% of the stock of Kirby Lumber 
Corp.(Kirby) in 1936. Over succeeding years, Santa Fe subsid-
iaries, including Resources, made additional purchases of Kirby 
stock. In 1967, pursuant to a tender offer at $65 per share, 
the predecessor of Resources increased its ownership of Kirby 
to 95%. A few additional purchases were thereafter made 
between 1968 and 1973 at prices ranging from $65 to $92.50 per 
share. 
In 1974, and for the purpose of acquiring 100% of the 
Kirby stock, a short form merger under Delaware law was 
accomplished between a new subsidiary of Resources (FPI Products, 
Inc.) with Kirby. The merger plan provided for the payment of 
$150 per share to the holders of the 25,324 minority shares 
outstanding. 
Section 253 of the Delaware Corporation Law, authorizing 
short form mergers, does not require consent of, or advance 
notice to, the minority stockholders. Notice of the merger is 
required, however, to be given within 10 days after its effective 
date, and dissatisfied stockholders are entitled to an appraisal 
of their shares in the Delaware Court of Chancery. 
Respondents do not deny that the merger was accomplished 
J. 
strictly in accordance with Delaware law. Moreover, notice of 
the merger was accompanied by a detailed "Information Statement" 
that - in addition to other facts - included an opinion by 
Morgan Stanley that the fair market value of the stock was 
$125 per share (although the highest actual sale price in the 
open market had been $92.50); an appraisal of Kirby's physical 
assets, which - assuming liquidation on the basis of that 
appraisal, and prior to taxes -~fleeted a value of about $700 
per share; and also an appraisal of Kirby's oil and gas royalty 
interests. 
Despite Morgan Stanley's appraisal of market value at 
$125 per share, dissenting stockholders were offered $150. 
Respondents initially invoked their right of appraisal 
under Delaware law, but later purported to withdraw their 
demand for an appraisal and filed this suit in the federal 
1/ 
court alleging 10b(5) violations.-
Although respondents' brief (p. 26) now makes an un-
persuasive contention that there were misrepresentations and 
nondisclosures in the information statement, the district court 
stated categorically that there were no allegations in the 
complaint of misstatements of fact or material omissions. (Petn • ... 
25A, 26A). Both courts below proceeded on the assumption that 
there were no such allegations. 
h~ 
The case was decided on &dllhdillFY j Pdgw&liW: motionA. The • 
!/A number of other stockholders are presently seeking 
appraisal in proceedings now in progress in the Del. Ct. of Chancery. 
DC's opinion summarizes plaintiff's allegations: 
"Plaintiffs' allegations have two distinct 
aspects. First, it is alleged that the means of 
effectuating this merger operated as a fraud on 
the minority shareholders in that the merger was 
consummated for the benefit of the majority 
shareholders, without any justifiable business 
purpose, except to freeze out the minority, and 
was effected without prior notice to the minority 
• shareholders. Second, plaintiffs allege that the 
low valuation placed on their shares in the cash 
exchange offer segment of the merger transaction 
was in itself a fraud actionable under Rule lOb-S." 
(Petn. 2la). 
Opinion of DC 
The DC granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for 
2/ 
failure to state a claim.- The DC emphasized that the case 
involves a merger of Delaware corporations, and that under 
Delaware law shareholders have no "vested right to remain 
shareholders"; minority shareholders may be "frozen out"; 
Delaware law does not require that the merger be effected for 
4. 
a business purpose; and the "statute reflects the public policy 
of Delaware with respect to the rights of splinter interests in 
corporations". In Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 187 A.2d 80, 0 
~ · ux 
it was said: y~f11" 
"The very ~rQose of the Delaware short . ~· 
form merger statute iS to provide the parent VV 
corporation with a means of eliminating the 
minority stockholders' interest in the enter-
prise." 
The district court accepted, for purposes of its decision, 
2/ 
- I was in error in stating above that the case was 
decided on a summary judgment motion. 
respondents' claim that their shares were worth $722 rather 
3/ 
than $150.- The DC nevertheless found no cause of action 
asserted under Rule 10b(5). It noted that respondents' claim 
was based, not upon misstatements or the omission of material 
facts, but upon information provided by the corporate defendants 
themselves. 
The DC continued as follows: 
"The complaint demonstrates merely that the 
parties to this action differ in their computation 
of the fair value of plaintiffS shares. Whatever 
the information statement indicates about thefuir 
value of plaintiffs' shares, the value of the 
physical assets ''was discernible, as plaintiff[s] 
discerned it . " Tanzer Economic Associates, Inc. 
v. Hatnie, 388 F. Supp. 365, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
See a so, Spie~ler v. Wills, 60 F.R.D. 681 (S.D. 
N.Y. 1973). T e adequacy of the offering price, 
standing alo~ does not demonstrate bad faith 
or overreaching on the part of the controlling 
interests. See Muschel v. Western Union Corpor-
ation, 310 A.2d 904 (Del.Ch. 1973)." Petn at 24a. 
·/( -,'( -,'( 
"It was for each shareholder to determine, on 
the basis of the information provided, whether the 
price offered was adequate or whether he should 
seek a judicial appraisal. The instant complaint 
fails to allege an omission, misstatement or 
fraudulent course of conduct that would have 
impeded a shareholder's judgment of the value of 
the offer. Cf. Levine v. Biddle Sawyer Cor~., 
383 F. Supp.--oT8 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)." Petnat Sa. 
1_/The DC noted, however, that the use of "liquidation 
value of Kirby's physical assets as the sole basis for deter-
mining the true worth of shares owned by minority stockholders 




Opinion of CA 2 
In a wide ranging opinion by Judge Medina (with some 
of his characteristically colorful language denouncing corporate 
manipulation), the majority opinion of CA 2 held that a cause 
of action is alleged under Rule 10b(5) where "a breach of 
f.iduciary duty" is char_ged, even in the absence of misrepresenta-
tion or nondisclosure: 
"Our later review of the decisions of this Court 
on the subject of allegations under Rule 10b(5) 
of breaches of fiduciary duty by a majority 
against minority shareholders without any 
charge of misrepresentation or lack of disclosure 
will, we think, demonstrate that in such cases ~A ~ 
misrepresentation or lack of disclosure are not 
essential ingredients of the claim for relief ~ .1~' .'. 
by the minority. But, lest there by any linger- ·~ 
I 
ing doubt on this point, we now hold that in such] _,) 
cases, including the one now be f ore us, no ---------
alle ation or roof of misrepresentation-or 
nond~sc osure ~s necessary. e n at 36a: 
CA 2 went on to hold that Delaware law was not controlling. 
Although CA 2 referred to the federal remedy under the Securities 
Exchange Act as "supplementary to those provided by the States", 
its holding actually would nullify Delaware law as declared by 
the Delaware courts (summarized in the opinion of the DC). 
CA 2, despite Delaware law to the contrary, found a 
federal "fiduciary duty to deal fairly with the minority" in a 
merger, and seemed to hold that offering a price of $150 for 
stock alleged to be worth $720 constitutes a fraud and breach 
of fiduciary duty even where there was a full disclosure of all 
relevant facts, and a remedy under Delaware law that was not 
found to be inadequate. 
7. 
Dissent of Judge Moore 
~~~ 
Judge Moore, obviously in a state of some shock ~ his 
Brothers' decisions, commenced his opinion: 
'\ 
"I strongly dissent from the use of their 
powers by two judges of one of the eleven judicial 
Circuits to override and nullify not only the 
corporate laws of Delaware with respect to short-
form corporate mergers, but also, in effect, 
comparable laws in an additional thirty-seven 
States." 
Judge Moore states -- with a good deal of reason --
that the majority opinion creates "an irrebutable presumption 
that the use of the short form merger law amounts to a fraud 
per se" wherever a dissenting stockholders avers that the 
price offered dissenters is grossly inadequate. 
It seems to me that Judge Moore's opinion also lays 
to rest the uncritical assumption by the majority that the 
averment of "no corporate purpose" must be accepted as correct. 
Anyone familiar with corporate law is aware of the problems 
and disadvantages that accrue to the majority stockholder where 
a small minority interest is outstanding. Judge Moore summarized 
some of the benefits of 100% ownership as follows: 
"The short-form merger procedure permits a 
corporation to retreat from the public marketplace 
of securities trading and assume the status of a 
private company. "Going private", as the process 
has been popularly labeled, is being more and more 
frequently resorted to in today's recession economy. 
The benefits to a corporation are varied. Freedom 
from worry about the impact of corporate decisions 
on stock prices; ability to take greater business 
risks than those sanctioned by federal securities 
agencies; a switch to more conservative accounting, 
resulting in lower taxes; the savings which result 
from no longer having to prepare, print and issue the 
myriad of documents required under federal and state 
disclosure laws; the removal. of a pressure to 
pay dividends at the expense of long-term 
capital development or speculative capital 
investment -- these are some of the advantages which 
may enure to a corporation "going private". It is 
essential to underscore that all of the above-stated 
advantages accrue from the very'act of eliminating 
the 10% shareholders who confer public status on 
the corSoration. To say that such action is not a 
"vall.dusiness reason" (plaintiffs' complaint) or 
a "justifiable corporate purpose" (the majority 
holding) is to completely misapprehend the impact 
of the shift in status from publicly held corpora-
tion to private company. Benefit to the parent 
company is not incompatible with the notion of 
"justifiable corporate purpose"; it is a legitimate 
part of it. As one commentator has noted: 
One selfish motivation is often 
adverted to in connection with going 
private, but one wonders why that 
should be. Are only those corporate 
transactions to be favored which are 
not motivated by greed? Must we seek 
to do public good in order to avoid 
regulatory sanctions? The questions 
'- answer themselves. To observe that 
greed is a compelling motivation is 
merely toObserve that we live in a free-
enterprise society. 
It should be obvious that minority shareholders are 
as similarly motivated as the majority owners, and 
that their concern is not the purported damage to 
the public of "going private" transactions -- the 
likelihood of which I seriously doubt -- but rather, 
the equally selfish desire to avoid taking a loss 
while "playing the market". Such a desire, I submit, 
I
, is a wholly inadequate justification for according 
~ . to the 10% a veto power over the will of the 90%. 
Even our political system does not require 100% con-
sensus before the majority will may be implemented; 
in fact, such a thought would be completely inimical 
to the values inherent in our democratic philosophy. 
(Pet. at 82a) 
Comments 
With all respect, I think my friend Judge Medina's 
opinion is out of the "blue sky". As I agree with the DC and 
o. 
much of Judge Moore's dissent, I will undertake no extended 
comment here. 
As I said in my concurring opinion in Blue-Chip, the 
starting point is the language of the statute. Also as I 
noted in Ernst and Ernst, the language of § lOb not the 
language of Rule 10b(5) -- is controlling. As the title of 
§ lOb indicates, it is concerned with "manipulative and 
deceptive devices". I would not have thought, until CA 2's 
opinion, that anyone would have deemed a merger to be such 
a device solely because the price offered dissenters was 
"grossly" below fair market value so long as there was no 
misstatement or omission of a material fact. The purpose of 
§ lOb and Rule 10b(5) is to substitute full disclosure for 
the doctrine of Caveat Emptor. Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. 128, 
151; Blue Chips Stamps, 421 U.S. at 744. 
Nor would I have thought that § lOb was intended to 
of 
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MR . .Jv~,;TICE Wmn; delivered the opinion of t,he Court. ~~A~~ 
The· issu(' in this case involves the reach and coverage of ...,._., ---,-~ ] 
§ 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of l!la4 and R uk /to........,~ ,_,{ 
lOb--:)' thcrC'under in the con~xt of a D<'lawart> F=hort-fonn 
' .Kt>rt ion 10 of tlw Rrrmities Exrhangr Af't of HJ:{4 ~ 1.'5 lJ. S. C. § i f.lj, ~ ~ 
proYidl?.~ in ff' )ryant . part: · , 
' ·Tt ;.; lwll hr unl:l\dnl for t1ny JX'I'son, dir~?rt l~· or indin•rtl~·, h~· th!• llS(' ol 
:lll ,' mrn n,; or inst rumrntulity of int.er~ tut<' rommPrrl' or of illf' mail~, or of $ . . L 
:ln:: f: \ ('i lit~· of an.' · national si?Ctll'itics cxchungr- ~ ~-/-
" 
"( I)) To ll ~(· or rm plo.1·, in I'OlllH' rtion with tiH' pun·ha ~r ur ~: !11• of 11!1\' ~~ 
,>(' !' lll'ity rrgi~tC'I'!'d 011 :l Jill t ion:tJ H'CUrit i!·~ I'Xrhange or HLI~' ~l'(' llfil ~ · 1101 
•o r<•!!ist <· rNI , an.'· ma nipulatil'l' or dr<·(•pti.vl? dr\'ie't' or I'Oll1 riYflll\'f' in r·oH-
f. r:n·!· n1 ion of ,.:nrll rulr~ nnd r<'gulntion ~ a" the Ccnuni~,-.:ion ma.'· pn•,crihr 
as IH '<'!'"":II'Y or appmpi·i;lt·P in tlw puhli r int en•,.: t or for tlw protl'!'tion nf 
in n •st or,.:." 
Rnk IOh- .'i. 17 C'FR § 240 .10h- 5, providr,,: 
.. hnpl o~·mrnt of IIJ:Illipul:itii'C· and d('CC'ptivl' dr,·ir!':" . 
" It "liidl I)(' unlawful for an~· JWl'~OJI. dirrrtl,\· or illdirf'f· tl~·. b~· thP 11~r of 
:u 11· nw:w~ or in>ttunwntality of iulN,.:t<\1(• <·omnwrrr , or of thl' mail:-· or of 
an~· f:ll'i lity of fillY nilt.ion:d ~('('llritirs l'X!'hilngc, 
·'(a) To rtnploy any dcvi('(•, ,.:rhrme, or artificr to dhfraud, 
'· (lot To makr an.1· untrur ,:tat cnwnt of :1 matNi;tl fnrt or to omit to 
o,;ln t(' a matrri:d fart IIN'r>"~a r~· in ordrr to mak<' 1hr stntruwnt ,: mHdr. in tlw 
li!! lll ,If· tlw r in·um:-;tan rr,.. undrr \\'hirh t!H'y wPrr m:uk , r1wt mi>l ra rlin!! . or 
''( r-) To Pngage in any tH't, l'l'll r ti ev, or eour,:r of hu,oin~.·" whir h opcnlt<·~ 
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merger trausactiou useu by the majority stockholdor of 11 
corpomtion to eliminate the minority .int,crcsL. 
I 
Tn 1936 petitioner Santa Fe Industries, fuc. ("Sa.nta F<'") 
, aequir<'d control of 60%· of the stock of Kirby Lumber Cor-
poration ("Kirby''), a Delaware corporation. Through a 
serif's of purchases over the succeeding years, Santa Fe in-
crrasC'd its control of Kirby's stock to 95%, ; the purchase 
prieC's during the period 1968-1973 ranged from $65 to $!J2Ji0 
per sharC'.2 In 1974, wishing to acquire 100%· owntlrship of 
Kirby, Santa Fe availed itself of § 253 of the DPlawnrc Cor-
poratiou Law. known as the "short form merger" statute. 
Section 253 permits a parent corporation owning at least HO)I, 
of the l'itock of a subsidiary to merge with that subsidiary, 
UpO!l apprOVfll by the parent's board of directors, and to makP 
payment in cash for the shares of the minority stockholders. 
Tlw statute does not require the consent of, or advance potief' 
to. tlw minority stockholders.. However, iwtice of the merger 
mnF:t. be given within 10 days after its effective dat0. and any 
stoekholder who is dissatisfied with the tern1s of thP mcrgC'r 
may petition the Delawar0 Court of Chancery ·for a dccrC'c 
ordcring the surviviug corporation to pa.y him tht' fair valu<' 
of his shares,, as determined by a court-appointN:I appraiS£'1.' 
suhjN•.t to review by the court. Del. Gen. Corj). Law ~~ 2.)!1 
(d)' 262. 
Rnnta Ff' obtained indep0ndent appraisals of the physical 
tlS:'iPts of Kirby-laud. timber, buildings. and maehinery-
nnrl of Kirby's oil. gas. a.nclmineral interests. TJ·ws(' nppt·r~is­
als. together with other financial information. wPre submitted 
or Windd opr r:ltP as a frand or dPI't'it 11po11 any pcr~on, in c·c; llllf·t·tion 11itl1 
liH· pllrC'ha:.:<' or ,.:n!c of any ~ec·urity." 
~ AppPndix :~:3a (mPrger information RtatPnwnt, ronsidPrPd hy p:1rtir~ 
nnd rourt b:olow as part of the nnwudro romph1int). Sa·t1fP Fr ront ro!IPd 
1\irh~ · through its wholly ow1wd ,;ubsidiar~·. Sr111ta Fe Natural l{l':.:OIIt'c<·,.: , 
ll'hich ownro thr KiriJ~· ~tod<. 
SANTA FE INDUSTHIES, INC., v. GR !~EN 
to Morgan Stanley & Company ("Morgan Stanley"), an in-
vestment bankiug firm retained to appraise the fair market 
value of Kirby stock. Kirby's physical assets werr appraised 
at $320 million (amounting to $640 fo11 each of the 500.000 
shares) ; Kirby's stock was valued by Morgan Stanley at $125 
JWr share. Under the terms of the merger, minority stock-
holdrrs were offered $150 per share. 
The provisions of the short-form .merger statute were fully 
complied with. 3 The mii1ority stockholders of Kirby were 
notified the day 'after the merger became effective and were 
advis<'d of their right to otbain an ttppraisal in Delaware 
court if dissatisfied with the offer of $150 per share. They 
also 1;eceived an information statemeut containing. i'u addi-
tion to the relevant financial data about Kirby, the apprai~als 
of the value of Kirby 's assets and the Morgan Stanley ap-
praisal concluding that the fair market value of tlw stock was 
$1~5 per share. 
Respondents, minority stockholders of Kirby, objected to 
the terms of the merger, but did not file a petition in the Del~ 
awan' Court of Chancery.' Instead, they brot1ght this action 
in federal court on behalf of the corporation and other minor-
ity stockholderR, seeking to set aside the merger.or ~o recover 
what they claimed to be the fair value of their shares. Tlw 
a1'nended complaint asserted that based on the fair market. 
a ThP tn('rgrr became rffective on .Jut~· :n, 1974, and wa~ a('eomp!i;;;lwd 
in tht' fol!owin~J: way. A new corpora.tion. Forrst. Product~ , Inc ., wa.-
orp:a~lizf'd as a. Dt>la.ware corporation. Thr Kirby stock. tO{If'thrr with cn,h, 
Wtl' trnnsfrrred from Santa Fe'~ wholly owJ1rd suboidinry ~( see n. :2 , supra) 
to ,Forest Pro<iuet::; in exchange for all of tlw For£·~t Product~ stoek . Thr 
new eorpomt.ion wus then merged into Kirby. with l(irby :\:; tlw ~urviving 
~orpomt.ion. Thr ca~h transfrrred to Forest Pr~ducts w:~ s used to makP 
tht" purrha.»e offer for 1 he Kirby sh:Hf'S not ownc>d · hy: t hr Snntu Fe 
~uhsidiary. 
·• On Aug11~t 21 , 1974, respondents prtitioned for an apprai~.al of tlwir 
l(irh~· ;;tock, but they withdrew that. petition on September 9 and the JH'Xt 
tl:1Y eommrn(•(•d thi;;; Jaw.:;ui~ . ' 
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va.Jue of Kirby's physical assets ns revea.Jed by tho appraisal · 
included in the Information Statement sent to minority share-
holder·s, Kirby's stock was worth at least $772 per share. · 
' The compaint alleged further that the merger took pin<'(' 
without prior notice to minority stockholders; that, tlw pur-
pose of the merger was to appropria.te the dift'ereneo bcbH~r·ll 
the "conceded pro rata of value of the physical a~sets" and 
the $150 per share oft'ered-to "freez[e] out, the minority 
stockholders at a wholly inadequate price.'' app. lOaR, lOOn ; 
a.nd that Santa Fe, knowing the appraised valun of. tlw physi-
cal assets, obtained a "fra.udulent appraisal' ' of the stock 
from Morga.p Stanley and offered $25 above that appraiRal " i11 
order to lull the minority stockholders into <·r·ronPously IH'-
lievi ng that [Santa Fe was] generous." App. 1 0:3a. Til if' 
course of conduct was alleged to be "a violation of Rttl<' lOh-;) 
because defendants employed a 'device, scheme or artifice•. to 
defraud ' and engaged in an 'act, practice or cours<• of h11 si Jw~s 
which opera.tes or would operate as a fraud 01.' df'cei1 upo11 
an'y person , in connection with the purchase or' sale of a11 Y 
· security.' " lbid.6 Morgan Stanley assertedly ·participated 
in .the fraud as an accessory 'by submitting its appraisal of 
Vfbe fi,2;urr of $772 lX'r share was calculated ns follow., : 
"Tlw cliff ere nee of 8311,000,000 ( $622 per share) bl'twcen t hr f ::t i r mn rht 
vnhte of J{irby 'rs land nnd timber, alone, m; per the dPfcnchnti'' 0\1'11 np-
prai~nl thereof nt $:320,000,000 and thr $9,000,000 book v:;h•r· of .•aid lnnd 
nnd timlwr, n.ddrd to the $150 per 8harr . yidds n pro r:t1:t ~hnn· of tlw 
vn hw of the phy~ i cn l nsst'ts of Kirby of at. lenst Si72 JWr Hhnrc•. Till· 
.vnhw of the ~;:toe )< wns at lea;,: t the pro rllta value of thC' phy~ i•·nl a,:~ei,, " 
App. 102:1. 
c• Tlw complaint also allegrd ll. bre11ch of fiduciary duty undc•r ~ t a tC' lnw 
nitd a~1:'ettC'cl tha t the federnl court had both diver>'ity :wd pl·nd:wt 
jmisdictiou qvt>r this claim. The District Court fourJ(I an 11bsr•nce of 
rompletr. divl'r:;ity of citizenship between tlw plaint iff!" and dc'fPII()a.nt ,.; 
brcn.use of the defendant Morgnn St~.nley and refused to exerci:;P (Jf'lldant 
juriHdi<'lion br(•anS<' if. held that tiJP compl11int fniled to .•tat e a rlaim und~t· 
the ff'df'rnl ~Cf'lll'iti fJI· htws. ;{91 F. Supp., :1t 855. 
I • 
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$125 per shm·c although knowing the appmisod value of the 
physical .assets. 
The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to 
stat,{' a claim upou which relief could be grantt-d. 391 F. 
Sti pp. 849 (SDNY 1975). As the Distrirt Court und«>rstood 
tlw eomplaint. J'Pspondents' caS«> rested on two disti11et 
~ ro und:-:. First. the federal la,w was assertedly violated be-
C'aUS(' the merger was for the sole purpose of eliminating the 
Ill i nority fr()m the company and therefore lacked any j ustifi-
abk business purpost' and because the mergm~ was undertaken 
\l:ithout prior notice to the minority shareholders. Sf.'cond. 
t hr low valuation placed on the sha.rcs in the cash exchange! 
offpr was itself said to be a fraud actionable under Rul(' 
1 Ob '-5. 1,1 rejecting the first ground for recowry , the Dis-
trict Court observed that Delaware law required neither a 
bus inf.'ss purpose for a. short-form merger nor prior uotiC(' to 
th(' lllinority shareholders. who~ the stt\tute contemplat<>d 1 
would be removed from the company, and that Rule lOb- 5 
did uot ovHrride thcS«> provisions of state corporate law by 
illdc•prndently placinl! a duty oi1 the majority not to tm•rge 
wi thout prior fjotict' and without a justifiabic business purpose. 
As for the claim that actionable fraud inhere(! in the alleg-
r dly gross undervaluation of the minority shares. the District 
( 'o11rt observed that. respondents valued. their sharPs at n 
minimum of $772 per share based "on the pro. rata value of 
Kirby's physical assets." !d., at 853. Accepting this valua-
t ion for purposes 6f the motion to dismiss~ the ,:Oistrict Court 
furthrr noted that, as revealed by the complaint. tho physical 
a ·se t appraisal. along with other information relevant to 
l\1organ Stanley 's valuation of the shares. had been included 
\\'ith the Information Statement sent to respondents within 
the time required by state law. It reasoned that if "full and 
fa ir disclosure is made, transactions eli1ninating a minority 
intC'rest are lwyond the purview of Rule lOb-.~. " and con-
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misstatement or fraudulent course of couduct that would have 
impeded a shareholder's judgment of the value of the offer." 
1d., at 854. The complaint therefore failed to state a claim 
and was dismissed.7 
A divided Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. 
533 f. 2d 1283 (1976). It first agreed that there was a 
double aspect to the case: first, the claim that gross under· 
valuation of the minority stock itself violated Rule lOb-5; 
and second. that "without any misrepresenta.tion or failure to 
disclose relevant facts, the n1erger constituted a violation of 
Rule lOb-5" becuase it was accomplished without any cor-
,porate business purpose and without prior notice to the 
minority stockholders. ld., at 1285. As to the first aspect· 
of the case, the Court of Appeals did not disturb the District 
Court's ' conclusion that the cpmplaint did not allege a. mate-
rial misrepresentation or nondisclosure with respect to the 
value 'of the stock; and the court declined to rule that a gross 
undervaluation itself would suffice to make out a Rule lOh-5 
case, · With respect to the second aspect of the ,case, however. 
the court fundamentally disagreed with the District Court as 
to the reach and coverage of Rule lOb-5. · The Court of 
·' Appeals' view was that. alt.hough the Rule p~ainly reached 
material misrepresentations and nondisclosures i;1 connection 
. with the purchase or sale of securities, neither I,nisrepresenta-
tion or noi1disclosure was a necessary element ~fa Rule 10b-5 
action; the rule reached "breaches of . fiduciary duty · by a. 
l 
7 The Di~trict Court. Also based its holding on the nltf'rn.ative ground 
I hnf 1 hr injnrie~ aJleged in the complAint were not c1tu~ully rl'latt'd to any 
d('('t'ption b~, thr majorit~· shu.rehold(•r. 
" A~,.;tmlinl! arguendo thttt the merger informntion !-ilatement did not 
I'On~t if utr :Hirtlttate disrlo;,ttr!) , tltt' amended complaint dcX•s not drmon-
'- lr:lf(• a CHu,.,al comwrtion betw«' n the alleg('d drception and plaintifl':;' 
da ntft~< ·~- Plaintiff~' did not. tendrr tlwir :;hare,; for canct'llntion and pn~r­
ntt•uf. 1 tttr,.:nant to thi:,: nwrgt>r plnn. . . . From the outi'icl , plairn;ffr,; 
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tnnjority 11gait1s~ miuority !:ihan•holders without any charg«' of 
tli.isrc'pi;t·sotltatiol1 or la~:kof disclosure." !d., at 1287.s The 
( 'OUI't \\'ent on to hold that the complaint taken a!' a whole 
:·d.n t<•d a ra usc• of act.ion under the Rule: 
"We' IH)ld that a Mmplaii1t alleges a. claitn nndf'r Rullt 
1()]> ... .') whC:n it chatges. in connection with u DP!awar·f' 
short form mE'rger, that . the majority ha~ ronlmittNI a 
hn~ach of its fiduciary duty to deal fairly with minority 
slwreholders by drocting the nwrgcr without any ju:"ti-· 
fiahle husi11ess purpose. Tlw minority sha~f'lwld (:rs al't· 
g;ivc•n .no prior notice of the merger , thus hu,·ing no op-
portunity to apply for injunctive rdief. and th(' pro~ 
posed price to be paid is substn.ntially lowe1: than tlw ap-
praised val uc reflected in the Inf()rmation Sta kmen L.' 1 
/d., at 1201; see id., ttt 1289.0 
We granted the petition for cei·tioral'i ~hallf'nging this hold· 
in~ bocam:e of t,he' importttnce of the issue involved to the 
administration of the fed£'ral Sf•curiLies · Jaws. 428 r. R. --
(107G). We reverse. 
II 
Rr>otion 10 (b) of the Hl34 Act makC's it "unlawful for Hll)' 
s Tlw totll't c01wluded it~'< di8cus~ion I hu': 
"Whether full di~closurc has bern made i;;: not the l'fll('inl inquir.'· ,.:itH't' il j, 
the Jnl-'l'ger and the undervaluation which t•ou,;litturd •fraud , alld 11 01 
whethrr or not the ma.it;rit~· dt>t r rmine;; to l:iy bnrt> th!'ir J'<'al motivt'"· If 
t.lwrr i;.; no vnlid purpoSI' for the mr•rgcr, tlwn evt' ll thr-· mo"r" brnzl'll 
' t!iFrlc;;ur(• of that faet to the minority l"hilr!'ho)d!'r:; in ' llo \l · n~· milign fi'' 
the frnudulent r•ondll(•t." ld. at 1292. 
u Thn Comt. of App<'als :lffirnwd, however, lht• di:;rui;;:~:.tl ·of tlw r•omp!ain1 
n~ agaim:t, Morgan Stauley & Co. Morgan St::mlt·~· , w; tlw Coun of 
Appr:tl.s . mldt•r,:tood it, had not bN.•n charged with purti<·ipating in tlw 
majority o;harrholdt>r·•' br<'HCh of fiduci11ry dut~·: it had b!'rll iuvolvf'd on!~ · 
in ' rvaluation of the ~tork ltnd tlw compilatiou of it ." rt'port with n·~J)('I'I 
thrretq. The complaint contained "no allrgntion:< lh:tt ~Ior~au Stan)p~· & 
Co. rngagrd in auy misrcpre"Pnlation or· nondi~clo~un' >'Urh :1:-; would >'Up .. 
por:t it>< liahi'lity to Huh• 101-r-5 (2)." /d., nt 1292. 
~ ' .. 
,, . 
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person ... to usf' or 0mploy ... any nHinipulatiw or UNl<'ptiv0 
dcvic(' or contrivance in rontraventio11 of [SEC rules]''; Hull' 
LOb--<\ promulgated by the REC under ~ 10 (b). prohibits. in 
acldition to nonciiRclosure and misrepresentation. any "artifice 
to defraud'' or any act "which operates or would operate as a 
fraud or deceit." ~o The court below construed the term 
"fraud" in Rule lOb-5 by adverting to the use of the term 
in several of this Court's decisions in contexts other thau the 
· 19:~4 Act and the related Securities Act of 193-.'l 15 U. S. C. 
§ 77a et seq.11 The Court of Appeals' approach to the inter-
prdation of Rule lOb-5 is inconsistent with that taken by 
the Court last Term in Ernst & Ern,st v: Hochfelder, 42~) U. R. 
H~5 (1976). 
Ernst .& Ernst makes clear that in deci<.Jing whether a com-
plaint states a cause of action for "fraud" under Rule lOb-5, 
''we turn first to the la11guage of§ 10 (b). for '[t]he starting 
point in every case involving construction of a: statute is the 
language itself.'" Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 
185. 197 (1976)~ quoting Blue Chips Stamps v. MamJ1' Drug 
t 
10 See n. 1, su1n·a.. . : 
11 The Court of Appeals quoted passages from Pepper v. Litton.. 30S U. S. 
2!}5, 306-307, 311 (1939) '(where this Court upb<'ld the dit:mllow!lnce of a 
hankntptcy claim of a controlling ~Stockholder who :violated hi.s fiduciary 
obligation to t.he other stockholders), and from i Stob:, Equity .Jurit:-
prudcnce § 187 (--); the Court al!>o cited cru;<."'S which quoted th<• pn.;~;age 
from .Justice Story's treatisf'-N/oore v. Crawford. 130 U. S. 122, 128 
(1889) (a diversity suit to compel execution of a deed he!d in constructive 
tru.st), nnd SEC v. Capital Gains Resea1·ch B'Ureati, Inc., 375 U. S. 180, 
194 (1963) · (Investment Adviser:; Act of 1940 prohibits, liS a. "fraud or 
deceit upon any client," n registered investment adviSt'r's failure to disclose 
to his clients his own financial interest in his recommen(lntions). Althou~th 
Capital Gians involved H stMute in the securities fif'ld, the Court':,: rel'l'rences 
to fmud iu the "equitHble" srnse of the term were prt•mised. on its rrcogni-
tion that Congress intended the Invrstment. Advi;;rrs Act to estnbJjsh 
frdernl fiduciary stnudards for investment. advisers: Se<' id .. at 191-192, 
194. Moreover, thr fmud that. the SEC sought to enjoin in Capital Gai11o1 
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Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (PowELL, J. , concurring). In 
holding that a cause of action under Rule 10b-5 does not lie 
for mere negligence, the Court began with the principle that 
"[a]seertainment of congressional intent with respect to the 
standard of liability created by a particular section of the 
[1933 and 1934} Acts must ... rest prirnariJy on the language 
of that section," 425 U. S .. at 200-201, and then focused on 
the statutory language of § 10 (b)-" [ t] he words 'manipula-
tive or. deceptive' used in conjunction with 'device or contriv-
ance.' " /d., 'at 197. The same language and the same princi-
ple apply to this case. 
To the extent that the Court of Appeals would rely on the 
use of the term "fraud'' in Rule lOb-5 to bring within the 
ainbit of the Rule all breaches of fiduciary duty in ~onnection 
with a securities transa<,tion , its interpretation would. like the 
· interpretation rejected by the Court i11 ·Erns"t & 'Ernst, "add a. 
gloss to the operative language of the statute quite different 
'frotn' its .commonly accepted meaning." /d., at 1199. But as 
the Court there held , the language of the ~tatute · must con-
trol the interpret~tion of the Rule: · · . 
"Rule 10b-5 was adopted pursuant to authority granted 
the . [Securities Excha.nge] ~ommissio11 ut?der § 10 (b). 
The . rulemaking power granted to . an administrative 
· agency charged with . the administration of ll· federal .stat- · 
·U~ ,is not the power to make la.w, Ratlier, it is 'the 
powe~ to adopt regulations to carry intp effect the will of 
Qongress as expressed by the sta.tute. ~ .. . . [The scope of 
the 'R.ulel cannot exceed the power granted the Commis-
sion 'by Congre88 under§ 10 (b) .'' /d., at '21'~-214 (cita-
. tions omitted).12 . 
l'l the case for adhering to the language ·of the statute is even stronger I 
here than ·in .Ernst & Ernst, where the interpretation of Rule lOb-5 
nejected by t.he Court was strongly urged by the Ccmn1!~sion . . St~e u!so 
Piper v. (Jhris-Craft Industries, Inc., 45 U. S. L. W .. 4182 ( ~977), and Blue 
Chip_ Sta'!'-pS v. Manor Drug Stor"s, 421 U. S. 723 :(1975) (rejecting 
interprt>tntions of Rule lOb-5 urged b~· the SEC a:< amicWt curial') . By 
I f ~ 
,, 
I 
I i : ;j 
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The language of § 10 (b) gives no indica~ion tha~ Congress 
meant . to prohibit any conduct not involving mauipulatiou or 
deceptior!. Nor have we been cited to any evidence in the 
legislative histor·y that would support a departure from the 
language of the statute. 19 "When a statute speaks so specifi-
cally in terms of manipulation and deception, ... and when 
its history reflects no more expansive inte1it, we are quite un-
willing to extend the scope of the statute .... " Id:. at 214 
(footll()ie omitted). Thus the claim of fraw:l aud fiduciary 
breach in this complaint states a cause of action under any 
part of Rule 10b-5 only if the conduct alleged can be fa.irly 
viewed as "manipulative or deceptive" within the meaning of 
the statute. 
III 
It is our judgment that the transaction if ca_rried out as 
alleged in the complaint, was neither deceptive not lll!lnipu-
lative and therefore did not violate either § 19 (b) of the . 
Act or Rule 10b-5. 
As we have indicated, the case comes to us on the premise 
. that the complaint faile~ to allege a material misrepresenta-
tion or material failure to disclose. The finding of the Dis-,, 
rontr11st, the Commission ~1ppnrent.ly has not concluded. tJ111f RuiP IOb--5 
.· should bo tJsed to rea.ch "going private" t.raqsactioh:> wberl" thf' majority 
stockholdf'r eliininates the minority nt an allegedly unf11ir pric{'. Sec SEC 
Sccnritie~>' Act Release No. 5567 (Feb. 6, 1975), CCH F.~deral Securities 
Law R<>porter ~~· 8(),104 (proposiJ1g Rul<>s 13e-3A :md 1:3~.-:?R deHiiug with 
"goiug private" trnll;;itctions, pur~uunt to six section,; of the 19a4 Act. 
including § 10 (b), but stating tha.t the Commission "ha¥ 1~enched no con-
' rl\lSiou:< with respl:'ct to thf' proposed rules"). · ·~~ 
t :t As t·hc Court. not('{) in Hochfelder, "Neither the intended scope of 
§ 10 (b) nor thr rra~ons for the changes in its opemth·c languag<> arc 
rcw·a l<>d rxplicitly iu the legislative history of the 1934 A,ct, which deals 
primarily with other aspects of the legislation." 425 U. s'., at 20'2. 'fhe 
ouly ;;pl'eifie refen•nce to § 10 in th(• Senatr Report on the 1934 Act merely 
~tat<>;; that. the . ~;ection was "nimed a.t fhose ma·nipulative ;md dereptive 
pra.(•.tire8 which h:wr Jx.Pn urmonstr11ted to fulfill no useful fnuC'tion." S, 
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trirt Court, undisturbed by the Court of Appeals. was that ~ 
there was no "omission" or "misstatement" in (accompany- -:_a_L.-A,.,.._~·~ 
ing the notice of merger. On the basis of the ill formation - / /, ~
provided, minority shareholders could either accept the price ~~ 
offered or reject it and seek an appraisal in the Delaware 
.Court of Chancery. Their choice was fairly presented, and 
they were furnished with all relevant information on which to 
baRe their decision.11 
We therefore find inapposite the cases relied upon by re-
spondents and the court below, in which the breaches of 
fiduciary duty held violative of Rule lOb-5 included some ele-
ment of deception.1 " Those cases forcefully reflect the prin-
1 ' In addition to their principal argumrnt. thnt thr complaint allPp:es a 
fmud und<•r clam:es (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5, respondPnt~ abo HI'J.!UC 
thai the romplainf allege~ nondi~closme and mi><reprr~entation in violation 
of rlau;.;r (b) of the Rule. Their major contrntion in thi,.; n·~pPPi i;.; thnt 
thr majorit.y stockholder's failure to give the minority advanct• uotirr of 
the mrrgrr wns n material nondisclosurr, Pven though the D<•lawarc short-
form merger statutP dor~S not rrquire such notice. l3rit'f for Hf•i'pomlents, 
at 27 . But rrspondt'Jlts do not indicate how thry might havr H<'t<'ci 
diffPrrntly had tlw~· hnd prior 11otict' of the merger. Indt'rd, tlw~· <H'cPpt 
lilt' conclu~;ion of both rourts bPlow that. under DPiawar<' law tlw.v could 
nof. h:tvr rnjoined thr mergt'r becau:;r an npprni~al proceedin11; i;: thrir ~oil' 
rrmrd~· in t.he Delnwarr courts for any allegt'd unfHirncss in the term,.: of 
i hr mrrg<>r. Thus the failure to givP advance notice was not a matc•rinl 
n ondi~elo,"UI'P within the mraning of the statute or the Hulr. Cf. 'J'SC 
T1/(lu8tries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc .. 426 U.S. 438 (1976). 
' " Thr drri~ion:< of thi;; Court relied upon b~· re~pondt'nt:.: all invol\'f•d 
drrPpiiv<· rondurt as part of the Rule 10b-5 violation :lil<>ged. Affiliatf'd 
l 'te r'iiizens v. United States, 406 U. S. 12R (1972) (mis~tatPmPnb of 
11111 t <'rin I f11ci usrcl by bank employees in position of market ma krr i o 
:lNptin· :-;fork nt Je,.:s thnn fair valur); Superintendrnt of lnsura11re of Neu• 
Yor'• 1' . Baukrrs Life & Casualty Co., 404 U. S. 6, 9 (1971) ('·~ellrr of 
bond" wa: dupt'd into believing that it, thr ;;rllt•r. would reeeiw thr 
proct·r<h•") . Cf. SEr' v. Capital Gains Research Bureau. :375 LT. S. 180 
(l9(J:3) (injunction under lnve:-:tmrnt AdvisPrs Aet of 1940 fo <'ompd 
l'<'J,!i~t rred invt';:imenf advio;rr io dii<close to hi~; clients his own finaucial 
inil' l'<',:f in hi~ rrconmwndation~) . 
We lutvr br<•n cit<•d to a lnrge number of rH:<rs in tlw Courts of Apprals, 
-
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.-ip[P th nt '· rl" IC'CLiO II 10 (b) JllUEt be !'Pad flrxibly, 110t tech~ 
11 L( a lly fll:d l'! ' ~ trict~vrly '' and that the statute provides a 
r·ullf't' of net ion for any plai11tiff who "suffedsJ an injury as a 
:·c'f'lllt of decrptive practices touching its sale I or purcha~el 
nf rr:·mitirs .... " Superintendent of Insurance of .\'etc 
l'erk \'. Uankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U. 8. 6. 12- 13 
1 1 ~ !71}. But tlw cases do not support the proposition. 
:t il oi' 1\'h ieh invo]v('d nn l' lrmC'nt of decrption as p~trf of the nclurin r~ · 
Pli.-r•nndn('t ht'ld to violntr Rult' lOb-5. E. (! .. Schoenbaum , .. Fi1·~tbrook . 
-10.1 F. 2d 215, 220 (C!\2 19f\~) (en banr), rcrt. drnird . :3!:):) l . S. ~)0(\ 
( l!JliD ) (ma jority slnrkholdrr nnd honrcl of clirrctor,; '' WC'I'l' l!llili~ · of 
il<'<'l•i,· it c. " the minorii~· s fo c khold t'r~); Drarhman , .. Jla rvt'!J . ~5;i F . 2d 
(:lli, 7:)7 (CA2 1972) (r 11 hmw) (Hnlr lOh-5 Yioln1ion :tllr!!l'd on fn('l'· 
kt 1n<l "jp ,lj~ti ngui~hahlr" by panel from Superinte11rlenl of III S'UI''III!' I ' 1· . 
J!rr!lkt· r .< /,i.fe & Ca.malty Co .. supra); 8rhlirk v . .Prnn-D ixi!' (' rmf!nl CMp .. 
507 F. ?d. i!74 (CA2 1974) , el'l't. drniNI , 421 0. S. 976 (1975) (;:t·IH'IlW of 
nl:ltk(•f manipulntion :mel nwrJ.?;er on unfair t•Prms, one a.,prct of whiell \1':1° 
mi-'l't·pn·-·cntntion); PaP7HJS " · Moss, 39:~ F . 2cl 865. 8fi9 (CA:{ lHoij) (''if 
n 'df'r l·p lion' i ~ requirrd in tlw prr~ent cont.cxt fof § 10 (h) a!ld Hn'r 
JOb-.1] , it io fn irl:v found hy viewin~ this frnud ns I hough t lw 'indr pl' ll< kill· 
.;Jc·c ''J: ,.Jder~ were Ft:mding in the p1art' of fhP defrauded ro1·por:11:-o c· ulll~ ·." 
ll'iwrr lilt' board of direclor;; pn s~rd n re.;olution rontaining al lr·n st iii'O 
!11 :1 trri:d miorrprPFen1 at ion,; and authorizing the ;:a ir of corporllt<· ~to1·k to 
fhp dircdor~ nt 11 prirc' brlow fnir market vnlur) ; Shell v . Hensley. 4;{1) F . 
:2d kJ0, ~2.5 (CA5 1070) (derivntivr ~;uit allegiug that corponlH.> oflicl·r~ 
u• .. cJ mi~ lr::~dinp: prox~· materials and otlwr reports to deerivP ~lwrPholckr:; 
r,·gnrding a bogus employment rontrart intPndecl to conceal improp<'r p:ly-
nwnt < to the co rpom tion pm::iden1 nnd I'C!l::1 1'ding pureha~l':' b~ · tht' 
curpcr:l1ion of rcrt:1in ~C'r·urities nf l'We~~iv(' pricPF): /t !'kan t v. DrcssPr. 
--!::! .) F. ~d H72, 8KZ (CA.'l 1970) (:1~ part of srhPmP to ca ns<' rorporalion 
to i"~u <' trra::mry ~ hart's HllCl a promi~~or~· note for 12:1'01'~1~· in ;11i<-qunt<' 
eun~idrr : 1 tion . ro q1oral I' offire r~ derPivcd :;ha reholder,.: by nw king a Hirm:l-
li•:·· mi~ t rpn·~~ ll![llion,; in llw corpornfion':; 11nnmllr('port and by failing tn 
fli( ' ; !I)~' -uch rrport tit(' IWX ! Yl':lf). f::er :Note, R9 Han·. L. n,.,., l!Hi, 
!D:.W (HJi6) Hn ting lhat no apprlln!r deci~ion brfore that of CA2 in tlli ~ 
CiH' and in Mrtrshcl v. AJi'W Fabrir Corp ., 5:~3 F . 2d 1277, vacnlt'd and 
1·(·nwndrd for a determination of mootne~;;. 428 IT. 8. - ( 197f)), "lt!ld 
~ ,r·rm itlrd a IOb- 5 rhirn willwn! ><ome rlrrnr•nt. of mi,;n'J)I'C'~Pnlnlion or 
nm•di~ r·Jo,u re") . 
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ad( lpkd by the Court. of ,'\ ppcals below anti urged by responu~ 
\'llts here. that a breach of fiduciary duty by majority stock-
l!oldcrs. without any d<•rt'[lt ion, misrepresentation. or non-
clil'nlosttn4. violates the stntntc atHI the Rule. 
! t is nlso readily apparent that the conduct alkged iu tht> 
eoillplaitlt vvas not "manipulative" within the m0aning of the 
~· lntutc. Manipulation is "virtually a term of art when US<'d 
in rontwction with securities markets." Ernst & Ernst. 4~.) 
1' . :-1., at Hl9. The term refers gf'ncrally to practices. such ns 
1\"ftsh sales. matched orders. or rigged pri<'es. that arc i Il-
l ended to mislead investors by artificially affectin~ mark1·1 
n('tivity. Rce. e. g., ~ fl of the 1934 Act. 15 cr. R. <'. ~ 78 (i) 
<prohibiting specific manipulative practices); E'n~.c;t & B1·nst, 
42;", TT. 8 .. at 105. 199 11. 21. 205; Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus-
tries, Inc. , 13 U.S. L. W. 4182. 4193 (1077) (Rule- lOb-6. nl-:o 
pron1ul~atPd under ~ 10 (b). is "an antimanipulative pruvi-
:.:ion dC'signed to protect the orderliness of the sPcuri ties Jnar-
kd dming distributions of stock" and "to prevent stimulative 
trudiug Ly an issuer in its own securities in order to en•c.ite au 
unnatural and unwarranted appearance of market actiYit~r'·): 
'2 ,\.Bromberg, :-iecuritics Law: Fraud~ 7.3 ( 1075); 2 L. Loss. 
SeC'uritic~ H!'gltlation 1541-70 (1061); 6, id., nt 37;');}-:~7()3 
( HlG$)). Seetion 10 (b)'s general prohibitio11 of practicrR 
<kenlcd by the SEC to be "rnanipula.tive"-in thi~ teclmi<.>nl 
sPnS<' of artificially afl'eeting market activity in tmler to mi~­
l<'ad investors- is fully consistent with the funclamelltal pur-
posP of the 1!):14 Act "to substitute a philosophy of full discJo .. 
tit•rr• for the philosophy of co.?·eat entptor ... . " Afjilia.ted [ ' ! ,, 
(' it. i .ze11s v. United .States, 406 U.S. 128, Jf>1 ( 1972), quot;nq· 
88C v. Capital Ooi?IS Research Bureau, Inc., 376 U. R. lSO. 
1~() ( lDu:~). lnckecl. nondit:closure is usually an C'SSCil1 iaJ <'lr'-
nwnt in a manipulativ0 selwme. 3 L. Loss. s·upra, at ];~() .\ 
::\o doubt Congress meant to prohibit the full rangr of in-
g('llJ0\18 dc,vicPs that might be used t.o munipulat<> securit1<•:< 
pril'CS. But we do not think it would have chos<>n this "l<'l'lll 
I 
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of art" if it had meant to bring within the scope of § 10 (b) 
instances of coporatc mismanagement such as this, in which 
the essence of the complaint is that shareholders were treated 
unfairly by a fiduciary. 
IV 
The language of the statute is, we think, "sufficiently clear 
in its context'' to be dispositive here, Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S., 
nt 201; but even if it were not, there arc additional consider~ 
11tions that weigh heavily against permitting a cause of actiou 
under Rule lOb-5 for the breach of corporate fiduciary duty 
alkgPd in this complaint. Congress did not expressly pro-
vidP a private cause of action for violations of ~ 10 (b) . 
. ·\lthough IVP have recognized an implied cause of action un. 
i lr•r that section in some circumstances, Superintendent of 
l/l.'mmnce of 1\·ew l"ork: v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 
supra, at 13 n. 9 (1971). we have also rccogniz<'d thnt a 
1 1ri n1tc cause of action under the antifraud provisions of the 
Securities Exchange Act should not be implied where it is 
' 'utJn<'cessary to ensure the fulfillment of Congress' purpose~ ·" 
in adoptill!!: the Aet. Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, 45 
lT. ~. L. W .. at 4193. C'f. J. l. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 
426. 4::H--4~:3 ( l!JG4). As we noted e:wlier. p. -. supra, the 
( 'uun r0pcatedly has described the "fundamental purpose'' 
of tlw Ad as impl<:'utenting a "philosopy of full disclosure''; . 
Oil Cc full and fair &:.;closure has occurred, .the fairness of Uw 
trrms of the transaetion is at most a tangei1tial concern of th(' 
s tatut(' . Cf. Jfills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U. S. 375. 
:~81 -- :385 (1970). As ill Corl v. Ash, 422 1J. S. 78. 80 (197.1), 
Wl' ar<' rPluctallt to imply a private cause of action to serve 
what, is "at best a subsidiary purpose'' of the fc~deral 
kgisla tion. 
An important rknwnt of the inquiry into the necessity for 
implyi11g a private cause of action is "whether 'the cause of 
twhon I isJ one traditionally relegated to state law .... ' ·· 
Pi;?er V. Chris-('mtt lnd'l,tstries, Inc., 4.) n. s. !-'· W., at 419Z, 
I' 
' ' 
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quoti11g Cu1·L v. Jsli, 42~ F. S .. at 78. The Delawarr Legisln-
tun' has :stipplied minority shareholdrrs " ·ith a cause of action 
in the D<'h\\·are Court of Chancer~r to recov<'r the> fair valtH· 
of Rhfl)'('S nllPgPdly unclt·rvaluNI in a short-form mPrgPr. SC'<' 
~- 1-NlJ>ra. Of eourse. the existrncc of a particular ~tnt<· law 
n'nwdy is not dispositivr of the qut>stion whether Congress 
nwant. to proviclr a federal remrdy, hut as iu Pi7Je1' and Cor/. 
'\'(' conclwlr tllflt "it is rntirrly appropriate in this inf'taJICf• to 
rc'lPgatc• r('r<Jlondcnt and ot.lwrs in his situation to \rhat(•V<'I' 
n'tnedy if' crrated by state ln\\' ... 422 { '. ~ .. at 84; 4;) l'. S. 
L. \\' .. ut41!)3. 
The rt'n~oning behind a holding that the complaint in tltif' 
ca:-;c· nllc•g<'d fr·aud undt'r RulP lOb-.3 could not bt' ea~ily <·on-
t l!i twd. 1t is diffieult to imaginr how a court eould di~­
tinguisb. for purpose's of Rule lOb-.3 fraud. bPtv.w•u a 1najority 
stoc·.kholdPr's usr of a short-form mcrgPr to eliminatt~ tlw 
llli1writ,y at an unfair pric<' atl<l thr usr of so1.1W otiH•r dt>vicc·. 
such as a long-form mergrr, tender offer. or liquidatio11. tu 
ach irvf' tlw same rf'sul t; or indf'ed ho\\' a cou,rt eould dis-
tingttish the abw;:es iu\·olwd in th<'S<' going privat(• transtw-
tiom: from otlwr typ<·s of fiduciary sp)f-dealing in\'oh·ing 
tran~nc:tions in securitirs . The rPsult would lw to brill ,!.!: 
within tlw Ruff' a widr variPt~· of corporate' ccmduct tntdi-
tionally left to state regulati011. [n addition to po!'lill~ a 
"danger of vexatious litigation \\'hich could rP.l"lllt froln n 
widely rxpandcd class of plaintiffs uudcr Rule lOh- .1) ," Blu e 
Chip Stamps\'. Manor Druu Stor9s, 421 U. ~- 723,740 (1075) . 
this nxknsion of thr federal securities laws would ovcrl11p 
and quite' possihly intcrf<'I'C' with Ftate corporate ]a\\'. FrdPrfll 
eourts applying a "fed0raJ fiduciary princip}('" UlldPr HIll<' 
lOb-.1) could br rxprctecl to depart from state fiduciary stand-
ards at least to tlw extent necessary to ensure uniformity 
within the federal system.'" Absent a clear indication of con-
'" For f•xampl!·, ~OilH' ::itatt·~ app11rt'nl I~· rPquir<• ·a ··valid rorpor:ttl' pur-
po~<'·· for t lw Plimination of t IH· minority intf'rest through ·"hort-form 
I . 
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gressional i11tent, we are reluctant to federaJize the substan~ 
Lial portion of the la\v of corporations that deals with transac~ . 
tions in securities, particularly where established state policies 
of corporate regulation would be overridden. As the Court 
stated in Cart v. Ash, supra, "Corporations arc creatures of 
state Ja·w, and investors commit their funds to corporatC' eli~ 
r<'ctors on the understanding that, except where federal law 
expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with 
respect to stockholders, state law will govern the intcmal af~ 
fairs of the corporation." 422 U. S., at 84 (emphasis added). 
We thus adhere to the position that "Congress by ~ 10 (b) 
did not seek to regulate transactions which constitute no more 
than internal corporate mismanagement." Superintendent of 
Insurance of New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 
U. S., at 12. There may well be a need for uniform ft>d<'rnl 
fiduciary standards to govern mergers such as that rhall<>ngt>d 
in this complaint. But those standards should 11ot bl' sup-
plied by .i udicial extension of ~ 10 (b) and H.ulc 1 Ob- .') to 
"cover the corporate universe." 17 
mrrgl'r, whercn~ otlwr Stntc•:; do not. Comp11re nryan "· Hrork ,t· We1•i11s 
Co .. -!90 F. 2d 56:3 (CA5), rc•rt. drniPd, -!19 r. S. ~H (197-t.) (mPrgt·r 
:\rrunp:rd b~· con trolling ::;tor kholdrr for no '· bu::;i IH'~s purpo~t·" ('X<·epl t <J 
rliminate 15% minority ~;torkholdrr violated Grorp:in ~hort-lorm mrrgrr 
~tatutr) with 8taufler v. Standard Hrands. htc .. -t.l Dr·!. Ch. 7, !Hi A. 2d 7,.,_ 
(Sup. Ct. 196:2) (Drlaware short-form merger st:t!utp ;dlow,.: lll:tjoril~ 
stockholdrr to eliminate tlw mi11orit.1· intrrC'~t without 1111~- c·orpor:ttc· pur-
po~r and :;ubject only to a11 apJHai~al rrmrdy). Thuf' lo thr rxte'Jll thai 
l{ulr lOb-5 i" intPrprrtrd to rC'qnirr a valid corporatr purJHl>'<' for C'lilllina-
lion of minorit~· "har<'holdrr,.: a~ well a>' a fair prier for thc•ir ~hare•,.., it 1\'0IIid 
impo,.:(' a ,.:tri('!<·r ,.:(ancJan[ of fiduciary dut~· than !hHt 1'C'(jllin•d b.1· lilt · 1:1\\' 
or ~OillP Stiite•:-;, 
1 ' C:tr~· . FC'dnalil-'lll and Corpor/1((' Law: Rrflrrtion~ Fpon lJPimv:tn•, 
:-::l Yal<· L . .1. O!i:l, 700 (HJ/4) (foot·notr omiHrd). Prol'e•,.:,.:or ('ar~· aq:;tl<',.: 
,·igoron,.:l~· for comprehrn,.:i,.,. frdrr:tl fiduciary ~~ audard,.:, but tlrgr,.: a 
"front:ll" :t1tark h~· a 11('\\' frdC'r:tl ,.:latulr rnthrr than an PXtt•n,.:ion or HuiP 
lOh- .'i. He· writ<'", "lt >'<'e'm."' anomalou:; to jig-,.:aw rvC'l'.\' kind of rorporah• 
di"ptiiC' in10 the l'c•dt•r:d rmJrl>< lhrotlgh the' sc•curiti<'~ :wt:-< as ·Jh<'~· ar<' 
,'J\:\TA FE I~Dll~TlllE:-< . 1:\T., u. (;1{!-:1·::\ 17 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is n·versed and the 
c·usr is remanded for further proceedings consiste11t with thi~ 
opinion. 
8o ordered. 
pn·~< 1111:>· writtc•11. " Ibid. 8<'P :d~o .'\ote, (;oillg !'rival(' . S4 Yal<· L. ./. \)():{ 
il!l/-1) (ptopo~ing tlw applicntio11 of trndiiional doetriHr·~ of ~ul>"f:llllil·<· 
c·clf 1 H>r:lt <· 1:111· 1 o problem~ of f:t i ntr·~~ ra i~<·d I> :-· .. goi11g I" iY:ti<' ., t r:tll~a <'I ion 
-u<'il a ~ ~ horl-form tnc·rg<•re) . 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
j;u:pumt {lfonrl cf tlrt ~lt _ifattg 
~as~ J. af. 2trc?'!~ 
March 10, 1977 
Re: No. 75-1753, Santa Fe Industries 
v. Green 
Dear Byron, 
I am glad to join your opinion for the 
Court in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
/ 
No. 75-1753 Santa 
75-1753 - Santa Fe Industries v. Green 
et al. 
~o: The Chief Justice 
Yr. Justice Br 










MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in part. 
For the reasons stated by Mr. Justice Blackmun in 
his dissenting opinion in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug 
-------- 1/ Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 761,- and those stated in my 
dissent in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, 45 U.S.L.W~ 
4182, 4196 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1977), I believe both of those 
cases were incorrectly decided. I foresee some danger that 
Part IV of the Court's opinion in this case may incorrectly 
be read as extending the holdings of those cases. Moreover, 
the entire discussion in Part IV is unnecessary to the 
decision of this case. Accordingly, I join only Parts I, 
II, and III of the Court's opinion. I would also add 
further emphasis to the fact that the controlling stockholders 
in this case did not breach any duty owed to the minority 
shareholders because (a) there was complete disclosure of the 
~elevant facts, and (b) the minority are entitled to receive 
2/ 
the fair value of their shares.- The facts alieged in the 
complaint do not constitute "fraud" within the meaning of 
Rule lOb-5. 
1/ See also Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 
F:2d 564 (CA7 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960. 
2/ The motivation for the merger is a matter of indifference 
to the minority stockholders because they retain no interest 
in the corporation after the merger is consummated. 
~u:prtm:t QJ~url of tfrt 'Jlfuittlt ,jta.tta 
~aaftinghm. ~. QJ. 2ll,?J!.~ 
CHAMBERS O F 
JUST ICE BYRON R . WHITE 
J.t: t 
March 11, 1977 
Re: No. 75-1753 - Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. 
Green 
Dear Thurgood: 
You have a good point. I am adding the 
following sentence to footnote 12: 
"Because we are concerned here only 
with§ lO(b), we intimate no view as 
to the Commission's authority to 
promulgate such rules under other 
sections of the Act." 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to Conference 
/ 
~u:prtmt <!tttttd ttf t~t ~b ~faftg 
' . 
'llht.afringftttt. ~. <!t· 2U.;i.l!c1 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL March 11, 1977 
Re: No. 75-1753, SantaFelndustries, Inc. v. Green 
Dear Byron: 
Although I voted the other way at Conference, I am 
very close to joining your opinion. I am concerned, however, 
that Part IV of the opinion could be read to say that the SEC 
has no authority under existing law to deal with the kind of 
practices alleged in the complaint. Since at least one of the 
provisions on which the SEC's proposed rules are based, 
§ 13(e), appears to be broader than § 10(b), I do not think 
we should express a view on the extent of the SEC's power. 
Could you see your way clear to amending footnote 12 so that 
it explicitly reserves the question of the Commission's authority 
to regulate "going private" under provisions other than § 10(b)? 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~nvtmtt <!feud of tlrt-'Jitnittlt ~taU$ 
'Jlfa$qinghttt. ~. <q. 2ll~Jl.~ 
March 14, 1977 




Mr. Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
~u:prttttt ~omtllf tlrt ~th ~ums 
jlrutfrhtgton. :!B. ~· 20.?~~ 
CHAMBE RS OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
March 15, 1977 




Please join me. 
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
Sincerely, 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.§uprnnt <!Joud of ±4t ~nitt~, j>.tattg 
JJ!nglyington. ~. <q. 20gl.).{..;t 
JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN . JR. 
., 
~larch 16, 1977 
RE: No. 75-1753 Santa Fe Industries v. Green 
Dear Byron: 
Would you please add the following at the foot of 
your opinion: 
11 Mr. Justice Brennan dissents and would 
affirm for substantially the reasons stated 
in the majority and concurring opinions in 
the Court of Appeals, 533 F. 2d 1283 (1976). 11 
Sincerely, 
N 
Mr. Justice White 
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